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This study evaluates the economic impact of product innovation by 
using firm-level data from the Community Innovation Survey 
conducted in Japan. It accounts for possible technological spillover 
from innovation activities and examines the extent to which new-to-
market product innovations contribute to firm performance. 
Econometric analysis using a simultaneous equation model reveals 
that new-to-market product innovation is likely to increase a firm’s 
sales without cannibalizing those of existing products and generate 
more technological spillover to other firms. Moreover, such innovation 
is more likely to emerge from firms collaborating with academic 
institutions. The paper concludes by discussing policy implications of 
these findings as well as points to the importance of cross-country 
comparison between Korea and Japan. 
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I. Introduction 
 
hile there is widespread agreement that innovation matters for growth, there is 
no conclusive evidence on what types of innovation best foster growth or which 
factors determine the types of innovation achieved. This paper, drawing on a unique 
innovation survey conducted in Japan, attempts to answer these questions with a 
particular focus on product innovation. The innovation survey used here identifies
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two types of product innovations: new-to-market (or radical) and new-to-firm (or 
incremental). 1  The latter covers the diffusion of an existing innovation to an 
additional firm; the innovation may have already been implemented by other firms 
but it is new to the firm in question. Firms that are the first to develop an innovation, 
in contrast, are classified as having achieved new-to-market innovation. Data on 
innovation types can help us assess whether there is a threshold level for the extent of 
innovation (i.e., “innovation height”) that leads to higher growth. This paper is the 
first attempt to examine the causes and consequences of innovation heights using 
firm-level analysis within an Asian country. Improving collective knowledge on this 
aspect of innovation is crucial for designing relevant policies. 
Innovation encompasses a wide range of activities and processes, including 
marketing, organizations, and knowledge transfers. Product innovation is, by 
definition, novel. The degree of novelty, however, differs by the product in question 
(Arundel and Hollanders 2005). Specifically examining new-to-market product 
innovation can add new insight to the existing literature in two respects. First, new-
to-market product innovation may contribute to firm performance to a greater extent 
than lesser innovation, as it provides a firm with temporary market power (Petrin 
2002). Second, new-to-market product innovation may entail technological spillover 
to other firms, spurring further innovative activities; this topic has attracted 
considerable attention both theoretically and empirically. 2 For example, recent 
studies of endogenous growth theory (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion 
and Howitt 1992; Klette and Kortum 2004) indicate that spillover from firms at the 
technological frontier play an important role. If new-to-market product innovation 
results in significant positive spillover, policies to promote such innovation would 
be justified from a social-welfare perspective (Spence 1984).  
Given this policy importance, this study quantitatively examines the nature of 
new-to-market product innovation in an effort to better understand its contribution 
to firm performance and its possible need for public policy attention. We propose 
an econometric model that comprises technological spillover, legal and non-legal 
protection measures, and other important variables relevant to new-to-market 
product innovation. Our model is similar to that proposed by Crépon, Duguet, and 
Mairesse (1998) (hereafter CDM) in that it also consists of a system of equations.3 
However, our estimation addresses possible endogeneity, an issue largely neglected 
in CDM. We then apply this model to firm-level data from the Japanese National 
Innovation Survey (JNIS). 
Despite its economic importance, little empirical work has focused on the height 
and novelty of product innovation. To the best of our knowledge, Duguet (2006) is 
the only exception. The present study builds on Duguet (2006) but differs in three 
important ways. First, Duguet (2006) lumps together product and process 
innovations into one basket even though the economics underlying the two types of 
1Since the former is novel only for the firm in question, new-to-market innovation encompasses new-to-firm 
innovation. 
2Arrow (1962) points out that an innovating firm cannot appropriate the outcome of its innovation activities 
owing to the inherent technological spillovers. Ever since, researchers have tried to quantify the degree of spillover, 
especially in terms of the social rate of return on R&D investments (See Griliches, 1992, for details). 
3The CDM approach has been adopted by other researchers, including Griffith, Huergo, Mairesse, and Peters 
(2006) with regards to France, Germany, Spain, and the UK and by Chudnovsky, López, and Pupato (2006) in a 
study of Argentina.  
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innovations is significantly different (e.g., Klepper 1996). In contrast, we focus 
solely on product innovation to clarify our analysis and interpretation. Second, we 
use sales, rather than productivity, as a measure of firm performance. It has been 
argued that productivity may be an inappropriate metric for assessing product 
innovation (e.g., Van Leeuwen and Klomp 2006; De Loecker 2011). Lastly, in 
order to capture the influence of technological spillover, we consider both 
technology outflow and inflow; Duguet (2006) focuses only on technology inflow. 
Incorporating technology outflow provides us with an unbiased picture of 
technological spillover in the context of JNIS. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of 
innovation activities across the major countries that conduct innovation surveys. 
Section III proposes a series of hypotheses on the relationship between new-to-
market product innovation and firm performance (Section III.A), technological 
spillover (Section III.B), and other characteristics including information sources, 
legal and non-legal protections, and public financial support (Section III.C). 
Section IV crafts an econometric model to test the hypotheses and then presents the 
results of the estimations. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Surveys of Product Innovation4 
 
While innovation is inherently difficult to quantify and measure, there have been 
several efforts to develop survey-based indicators. Traditional indicators of product 
innovation include R&D expenditures and patents. These indicators, however, are 
mere inputs into the innovation processes as they do not capture key aspects of 
innovation processes and outputs, as noted by Griliches (1987, cited in Smith 2005). 
As such, targeted innovation surveys have been developed to collect qualitative and 
quantitative data on innovation activities within firms and on the successful 
introduction of different types of innovations into the market. These surveys 
deliberately seek to obtain data on innovation outputs and inputs beyond the 
traditional indicators of innovation (OECD 2009).5 
In innovation surveys, firms are asked to provide information on inputs, outputs, 
and behavioral dimensions of their innovation activities. On the input side, 
innovation surveys measure a firm’s intangible assets; beyond R&D expenditures, 
these include spending on training and acquisitions of patents and licenses. On the 
output side, data are collected on whether a firm has introduced a new product or 
process and the share of sales attributable to new products. Other indicators capture 
the nature of the innovative activities, including their impacts, collaborations and 
linkages with other firms or public research organizations, perceived obstacles to 
innovation, and knowledge flows (OECD 2009). 
To ensure the quality of innovation surveys, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a manual known as the Oslo 
4The description in this section relies heavily on Smith (2005), Mairesse and Mohnen (2010), and OECD 
(2009). 
5The JNIS results show that 47.3% of firms conducting innovation activities report that R&D expenditures are 
zero; similar phenomena are reported in Arundel, Bordoy, and Kanerva (2008) and have been observed in other 
countries. 
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Manual (OECD 1992) and synthesized the results of earlier innovation surveys—
notably the Yale Survey on Industrial Research and Development and the Carnegie-
Mellon University R&D Survey in the United States.6 The OECD Oslo Manual 
identifies product and process innovations as technological innovations; product 
innovation is defined as the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses. This 
includes significant improvements in technical specifications, components and 
materials, incorporated software, user-friendliness, or other functional 
characteristics. Process innovation is defined as the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved production or delivery method, including significant 
changes in techniques, equipment, and/or software (OECD 2009).  
The European Commission, via a joint initiative of Eurostat and the Directorate-
General for Enterprise and Industry, followed up the OECD initiative to implement 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which seeks to collect internationally 
comparable firm-level quantitative measures of innovation inputs and outputs. The 
basic CIS format has now been applied in many other countries, including South 
Korea and Japan. Figure 1 takes advantage of this rich set of data to list the countries 
with the highest proportions of respondent firms with either product innovation (left 
panel) or process innovation (right panel).7 Casual observation indicates that those 
countries with the highest portions of firms product innovations also exhibit high 
shares for process innovations; indeed, the rank correlation is 0.71. While the data for 
Korea refers only to the manufacturing sector, its share of firms with product 
innovation (35.7%) far higher than that of Japan (20.3%). This order reverses for 
process innovation: 26.6% for Japan and 22.5% for Korea. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
6See Smith (2005) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) for details of community innovation surveys. 
7The national innovation surveys from which these results come were conducted between 2002 and 2004, 
except for Japan (2006 to 2008), Switzerland (2003 to 2005), and Australia and New Zealand (2004 to 2005). The 
proportions listed in the figure are adjusted based on country differences in terms of firm-size distributions to 
enable us to make an international comparison. 
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FIGURE 2: PRODUCT INNOVATION HEIGHT AND SALES 
 
 
FIGURE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FOR JNIS 
 
The Oslo Manual distinguishes between the two types of innovation noted in the 
introduction: new-to-firm and new-to-market. We consider the height of product 
innovation to be represented by the new-to-market product innovation. Figure 2 thus 
considers this type of innovation. The left panel presents the proportion of respondent 
firms that achieved such innovations. The rank correlation between product 
innovation (the right panel of Figure 1) and new-to-market product innovation is 0.67. 
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the average share of total sales that are new 
product sales.8 
8OECD (2009) lists Korea (only for the manufacturing sector) for the share of firms with new-to-market 
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The Japaneese National Innovation Survey (JNIS), the dataset used in this paper, 
follows the Oslo Manual with a reference period from April 1, 2006 to March 31, 
2009. Using a stratified sampling technique, a sample of firms were selected from 
those listed in the Establishment and Enterprise Census 2006, which was conducted 
by the Statistics Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
The sample used here is further restricted to firms with more than 10 employees. The 
response rate is 30.3%, corresponding to a sample of 4,579 firms. Figure 3 shows the 
proportions of respondent firms that succeeded in either product or process 
innovations (or both). The figure indicates that 48.1% of firms in the survey 
innovated, with a substantial share of those firms having succeeded in both types of 
innovation. The share of firms that innovated increases with firm size and is higher 
for the manufacturing sector than the service sector. 
 
III. Hypotheses Related to New-to-Market Product Innovation 
 
This section proposes eight hypotheses related to new-to-market product 
innovation, which will be tested in Section IV. The present section consists of three 
subsections. Section III.A discusses how new-to-market product innovation might 
improve firm performance. The second subsection focuses on technological spillover 
in innovation activities. Section III.C then discusses policy issues. 
 
A. Firm Performance 
 
First, we examine the effect of product innovation on firm performance. This can 
be analyzed by decomposing firm performance into two dimensions: sales of new 
and existing products. This is shown in Figure 4, where the horizontal axis represents 
changes in sales of a new product and the vertical axis measures changes in the sales 
of existing goods. It is often assumed that the introduction of a new product 
 
 
FIGURE 4: PRODUCT INNOVATION AND FIRM SALES 
innovations, but no data for Korea is available for new product sales as a portion of total sales. 
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cannibalizes existing goods’ sales. If demand for a new product is a perfect substitute 
for demand for existing goods, the net effect of product innovation on the firm’s total 
sales is indicated by the (negative) 45-degree line in the figure. If the new good does 
not substitute for old goods whatsoever, the net total sales would be in the full area 
above the (negative) 45-degree line, as represented by the grey area in Figure 1. 
Consistent with this view, Duguet (2006) shows that only new-to-market 
innovations (i.e., radical innovations) can improve a firm’s net-performance. Barlet, 
Duguet, Encaoua, and Pradel (1998) also indicate that the novelty of an innovation 
can increase the share of sales that are innovation-related in situations where 
technology is important. The following hypothesis captures this effect: 
Hypothesis 1: The sales of a new product are larger for a firm achieving new-
to-market product innovation than for a firm offering new-to-firm product 
innovation. 
According to JNIS sales information from JNIS,9 the average sales value of new 
products in FY2008 was 5,586 million JPY for firms with new-to-market product 
innovations and 3,004 million JPY for other firms. Figure 5 shows a box-plot of the 
sales of a new product for firms with new-to-market product innovation and for 
those with new-to-firm product innovation. The top and bottom of the rectangle in 
each graph represent the 25th and 75th percentiles of the sales distribution, 
respectively, and the dashed line represents the median. Median sales are 196 
million JPY for new-to-market product innovations and 164 million JPY for new-
to-firm innovations. Moreover, it should be noted that the 75th percentile of sales 
value for new-to-market product innovation is much higher than that for new-to-
firm product innovation. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: INNOVATION HEIGHT AND NEW PRODUCT SALES 
 
 
9To be precise, JNIS asks each firm about the share of its new product sales. We recover the sales from the 
new product by multiplying the share by each firm’s total sales reported in FY2008.  
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Next, we turn to sales of existing goods. Jefferson, Huamao, Xiaojing, and 
Xiaoyun (2006) point out that innovation does not necessarily improve firm 
performance, suggesting that cannibalization with a firm’s existing products can 
severely deteriorate the firm’s profitability. This leads to the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher sales of a new product decrease sales of a firm’s existing 
products. 
Hypothesis 3: The more innovative a new product, the more intense the 
cannibalization of sales of existing goods. 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we must understand the impact of product 
innovation on the sales of a firm’s existing goods. We thus calculate the changes in 
the sales of existing products from FY2006 to FY2008. The left-hand panel of 
Figure 6 plots the relationship between sales of a newly introduced product 
(including both new-to-market and new-to-firm product innovations) and changes 
in the sales of existing products, following the analytical framework discussed in 
Figure 4.10 Sales arising from product innovation appear to cannibalize sales of 
existing goods. This observation is consistent with Hypothesis 2 in that the 
introduction of a new product substitutes the demand for existing goods. The 
change in total sales (i.e., the sum of the changes in the sales of existing goods and 
of those resulting from new-to-market product innovation) is uniformly positive 
and approximately 1,500 million JPY on average. 
The right-hand side of Figure 6 plots the same relationship separately for firms 
with new-to-market product innovation and those with new-to-firm product 
innovation, showing a significant difference between the two. The average 
relationship for firms with new-to-firm product innovation lies almost on the 
(negative) 45-degree line, indicating that sales of these new-to-firm products fully  
 
 
FIGURE 6: SALES OF NEW AND EXISTING PRODUCTS 
10We use LOWESS (Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing) to smoothen the algorithm. 
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cannibalize existing-good sales. On the contrary, the average relationship for firms 
with new-to-market product innovation lies well above the line; sales of a new-to-
market product increase the firm’s total sales. Instances of cannibalization between 
new and existing goods is thus less severe with regard to new-to-market product 
innovation than for new-to-firm product innovation. These observations are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. Combining the insights of Figures 5 and 6 suggests 
that new-to-market product innovation increases a firm’s total sales, even with the 
loss due to cannibalization. 
 
B. Technological Spillover 
 
Economics researchers, most notably Arrow (1962), point out that an innovating 
firm cannot fully appropriate all outcomes of its innovation activities owing to the 
existence of technological spillover. In contrast to the findings of several studies 
(e.g., Bloom, Schankerman, and van Reenen 2013), we directly collect self-
reported data on technological spillover as extracted from information on a firm’s 
technology acquisitions (i.e., inflows) and technology provisions (i.e., outflows). 
Of special importance are technology provisions through channels that are less 
likely to include monetary compensation, such as open-sourcing and consortia 
participation. If firms do not consider this type of spillover when deciding whether 
to undertake innovation activities, innovation could be under-supplied by the 
private sector. 
A number of recent studies of endogenous growth theory (e.g., Grossman and 
Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Klette and Kortum 2004) and some on 
dynamic estimation (e.g., Xu 2006) assume the presence of technological spillover 
arising from firms at the technological frontier through nonmonetary channels. 
Considering that the firms undertaking new-to-market product innovation are more 
likely to be situated near the technological frontier, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with new-to-market product innovation are more likely 
than firms with new-to-firm product innovation to provide their technology 
through open-sourcing or participation in consortia. 
Among the empirical studies focused on technology inflow, Kaiser (2002) 
considers incoming spillover effects to examine the relationship between research 
cooperation and research expenditures. His results indicate that horizontal spillover 
leads to firms to engage in aggressive investments in innovation through research 
collaborations. In a similar vein, Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) examine 
research consortia using the approach taken by Katz (1986), finding that spillover 
effects in research consortia have a positive impact on firm performance. These 
findings suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Sales of a new product are greater for firms that acquire 
technology through consortia than for other firms. 
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FIGURE 7: TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION AND PROVISION 
 
Figure 7 summarizes firms’ technology acquisition and provision practices based 
on the information provided by JNIS. Following the Oslo Manual, the figure 
presents six channels: R&D outsourcing, offering equipment, licensing contracts, 
outsourcing, consortia, and alliances. The circle and asterisk plotted for each 
channel in the figure represent the relative firm ratios. The ratios plotted with 
circles are obtained by dividing the number of firms engaging in the given activity 
that have new-to-market product innovation by the number of firms engaging in the 
given activity with new-to-firm innovation. The asterisks refer to the ratio of the 
number of firms attaining sales at or above the median of the sales distribution (168 
million JPY) to the number of firms with sales below the median. While product 
innovations among those with sales above the median appear to be more common 
for firms using the channels associated with monetary compensation (e.g., 
licensing), new-to-market product innovation seems clustered in nonmonetary 
channels, such as open-sourcing and participation in consortia. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
The right-hand panel in the figure considers firms’ technology acquisition. There 
is little worth mentioning regarding new-to-market product innovation by means of 
technology acquisition, but firms with sales above the median tend to acquire 
technology through licensing and consortia participation in consortia, consistent 
with Hypothesis 5. Combining this observation with the results shown in the left-
hand side of Figure 7 suggests that consortia participation plays a significant role in 
fostering technological spillover. Indeed, Figure 7 hints that firms with new-to-
market product innovation provide their technology to other firms through 
consortia and that such technological spillover could contribute to higher sales 
following the introduction of new products. 
 
C. Other Characteristics of New-to-Market Product Innovation 
 
The basic analysis of the previous subsections has suggested that new-to-market 
product innovation leads to improvements in firm performance and exhibits strong 
technological spillover. This finding implies that public policies which encourage 
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firms to engage in new-to-market innovation would be justified from a social 
welfare standpoint. To implement such policies effectively, however, it is necessary 
to have a deeper understanding of the characteristics of new-to-market product 
innovation. As such, this subsection focuses on firm characteristics associated with 
new-to-market product innovation, considering information sources, means of 
protecting innovation benefits, and public financial support. 
 
1. Information sources 
 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between information sources 
and innovation height. Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin (2004) examine the 
relationship between cooperative R&D and firm performance, finding that using 
information provided by consumers or universities has positive impacts on new 
product sales and that cooperation with universities likely fosters new-to-market 
product innovations. Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) also study the degree of firms’ 
interaction between universities and the resulting propensity to generate new-to-
market product innovation. However, their results suggest that such interaction 
does not necessarily result in fruitful outcomes. With a few exceptions,11 most 
studies imply that information from universities positively affects innovation 
novelty, allowing us to summarize this in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with new-to-market product innovation are more likely 
than those with new-to-firm product innovation to have obtained information 
from universities for their innovation activities. 
Figure 8 shows the ratios of the different types of firms (innovating and high-
selling) utilizing different information sources for their innovation activities. 
Similar to the definition given in Figure 7, the circles denote the ratios of firms 
with new-to-market product innovation to firms without among firms using the 
given information source, and asterisks represent the equivalent for firms with  
 
 
FIGURE 8: INFORMATION SOURCES  
11Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) suggest that information from universities encourages new-to-firm 
innovation. 
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higher-than-median sales of new products. While firms that attain sales at or above 
the median from product innovation use various information sources, firms with 
new-to-market product innovation tend to obtain information from universities or 
patents held by other firms, supporting Hypothesis 6. 
 
2. Ways of protecting the benefits of innovation 
 
While it is usually difficult for firms to fully appropriate innovation benefits, 
they do make partial efforts to protect them through legal processes (e.g., patent 
protection) or other means, such as the use of trade secrets. In theory, legal means 
of protection serve to encourage innovation activities by providing firms with a 
premium for innovation. Among recent empirical studies, Duguet and Lelarge 
(2006) examined the effectiveness of patent protection for safeguarding firms’ 
potential rewards from product innovation. However, legal means of protection 
may not always work perfectly (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 1987). As 
noted in the previous section, there are potential positive spillover from new-to-
market product innovation. In view of this, legal means may not effectively protect 
the profits arising from new-to-market product innovation. As such, we arrive at 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Firms with new-to-market product innovation are no more likely 
than firms with new-to-firm product innovation to use legal protection as 
opposed to non-legal protection. 
Figure 9 summarizes the ratios of firms used to protect innovation benefits. As 
before, a circle indicates firms with new-to-market product innovation and an 
asterisk represents new product sales. While firms with above-median sales from 
product innovation tend to rely more heavily on legal protection, firms with new-
to-market product innovation shows no clear patterns with regard to their use of 
legal and non-legal means. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 7, indicating 
that legal means do not fully protect firms’ new-to-market product innovations. 
 
 
FIGURE 9: MEASURES FOR PROTECTING INNOVATION BENEFITS 
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3. Public financial support 
 
Lastly, we examine public financial support for innovation activities. This topic 
has been well studied in the literature on R&D subsidies and investment. For 
example, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) use a matching method to show that R&D 
subsidies stimulate firms’ innovation activities. González, Jaumandreu, and Pazó 
(2005) also indicate that some firms would not invest in R&D without subsidies 
and that this does not crowd-out private R&D investment. In addition, other recent 
studies consider other, non-subsidy forms of public financial support. Finger 
(2008), for instance, examines the effect of R&D tax credits by considering the 
interdependence of firms’ R&D investments, showing that such tax credits 
encourage R&D investments by firms in a limited manner. 
Meanwhile, among the few studies of the relationship between public financial 
support and innovation novelty, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) raise the possibility 
that interacting with public institutions leads to new-to-market product innovation. 
If such interaction through channels other than information provision also 
encourages new-to-market product innovation, public financial support could 
positively impact innovation height and novelty. Hence, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: Firms with new-to-market product innovation are more likely 
than firms with new-to-firm product innovation to receive public financial 
support. 
Figure 10 plots the share of firms with new-to-firm product innovation, 
indicating whether the firms received public financial support,12 by firm size.13  
 
 
FIGURE 10: NOVELTY AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT, BY FIRM SIZE 
 
12Financial support primarily includes tax credits, subsidies, and loan guarantees. 
13Small firms have fewer than 50 employees, mid-sized firms have 50–249 employees, and large firms have 
250 or more employees. 
                                           
VOL. 37 NO. 1  Innovation Height and Firm Performance  57 
Among mid- and large-sized firms, a higher share of publicly supported firms 
produced new-to-market innovations; this is not the case, however, for small-sized 
firms. Hence, Hypothesis 8 may apply selectively, depending on firm size, perhaps 
because nonfinancial bottlenecks to new-to-market product innovation exist for 
smaller firms. For example, small-sized firms are less likely to take advantage of 
information from universities (Nishikawa, Isogawa, and Ohashi 2010), which may 
hinder their efforts to conduct new-to-market innovations according to the 
discussion in Section III.C. In this context, policies that increase interaction 
between firms and universities may help support innovation among small-sized 
firms. 
 
IV. Econometric Analysis 
 
The previous section proposed a series of hypotheses on new-to-market product 
innovation and examined simple statistical correlations in the JNIS data, which 
were generally consistent with each of the hypotheses. However, drawing 
conclusions from such casual observations is inadequate owing to omitted variable 
bias: firm innovation activities and outcomes are affected by numerous factors, 
many of which are not controlled for in the previous section. Ignoring the 
endogeneity of some variables of interest could also distort estimation results. To 
address these challenges, this section first presents an econometric framework 
(Section IV.A) and subsequently uses it to determine the robustness of our findings 
presented in the previous section (Section IV.B).  
 
A. Econometric Model and Estimation 
 
The model proposed here consists of a system of three sets of equations. The 
first refers to firm R&D investment. As is well known, R&D expenditures are 
endogenously determined; any analyses that ignore such endogeneity may suffer 
from biased estimates. We thus follow the approach taken in the existing literature 
and add an equation to model R&D expenditures. Among the factors that may 
affect a firm’s R&D expenditures, the consumer demand structure is considered to 
be a major determinant (e.g., Levin and Reiss 1984). This is sometimes called the 
demand-pull factor. While CDM base their analysis on the influence of market 
demand, we control for the market-size effect by using industry dummies as well as 
a dummy that indicates whether the market size expanded during the survey period. 
A second factor that may influence R&D expenditures is technological 
opportunities (e.g., Rosenberg 1974; Levin and Reiss 1984), or the technology-
push factor. To capture this effect, we focus on a firm’s technology acquisition by 
firms (i.e., the inflows of technological spillover, as noted in Section III). 
Specifically, we create variables reflecting technology acquisitions based on the 
information available in JNIS; namely, we note which channels a respondent firm 
used to acquire its technology (shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 7). 
We also incorporate information sources into the R&D expenditure equation. 
Certain past studies, including Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin (2004), focus on 
information sources as a means of capturing the inflow of technological spillover. 
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As shown in Figure 8, JNIS includes information on the information sources relied 
upon by respondent firms, which we use to create a dummy variable. Besides the 
demand-pull and technology-push factors, CDM explore what is known as the 
‘Schumpeterian Hypothesis’ by including factors that capture the effects of firm 
size and market power.14 Following their approach, we use firm-size dummies, the 
number of competitors in the domestic market, and a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the market has undergone product diversification during the survey period. 
Lastly, we consider public financial support for firms’ innovation activities, an 
issue not addressed in CDM. As described in Section II, a number of studies have 
sought to identify the effect of public aid on firm innovation. We thus create a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a firm receives any financial support from 
local public agencies or the central government. 
The second set of equations captures innovation output by firms. As a measure 
of output, we focus on innovation height or novelty as analyzed by Duguet (2006), 
and the protection of the innovation benefits for which a proxy is established by 
CDM, i.e., the number of patent applications. However, for the latter, we do not 
restrict our attention to patents as firms use various means of protecting their 
innovation benefits including both legal and non-legal protection, different degrees 
of the complexity of production methods, and trade secrets—as shown in Figure 9. 
We therefore construct variables to capture whether a firm uses legal or non-legal 
means of protection. For the explanatory variables, we use a set of variables similar 
to that adopted in the first step, adding a firm’s R&D expenditures. These are 
regarded as endogenously determined in the first stage—indeed, many empirical 
studies, including CDM, consider a firm’s R&D investment to be an innovation 
input. We omit the number of competitors in the domestic market in this stage, just 
as CDM omit market share from their second stage. In addition to these variables, 
we use innovation novelty as an explanatory variable for innovation benefit 
protection (Hypothesis 7). 
The third set of equations captures a firm’s sales and its technology provision. 
For the former, we separately consider sales of both new and existing products. 
This is important in analyses of the economic outcomes of product innovation as 
such variables can theoretically capture the effects of cannibalization. With regard 
to the technology provisions by firms, we focus on the channels less likely to be 
accompanied by monetary compensation by creating a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if a firm provides its technology through open sourcing or 
consortia participation and zero otherwise. 
We include three types of explanatory variables in the equations determining 
product sales and technology provisions. First, we include new-to-market product 
innovation and the protection of innovation benefits, which are both endogenously 
determined in the first stage, as mentioned above. Following CDM and Duguet 
(2006), these innovation outcomes may positively impact firm performance. 
Second, we use the same explanatory variables identical to those adopted in the 
second stage as control variables. We thus control for the effects of demand and  
14Much theoretical work has considered whether market concentration encourages firms’ innovation activities. 
The replacement effect (Arrow, 1962) and the efficiency or Schumpeterian effect (Schumpeter, 1943; Gilbert and 
Newbury, 1982; Reinganum, 1983) are well known. Several empirical studies, including Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith, and Howitt (2005), have tried to quantify the net impact of these two effects. 
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FIGURE 11: OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
 
 
technological conditions, firm size (specifically the number of employees), and 
product diversification. Third, corresponding to explanatory variables in the third 
stage of CDM, we consider the acquisition of tangible fixed assets and the number 
of R&D personnel.15 In contrast, for the explanatory variables in the equation 
determining existing products sales, we consider innovation novelty, new product 
sales, and (as a control variable), the firms’ total sales in FY2006. We also include 
firm-size and industry dummies. With this equation, we aim to quantify the degree 
of cannibalization and the extent to which innovation novelty affects this. Figure 11 
summarizes the structure of the model described above and used to test the 
hypotheses developed in Section III. 
 
1. Comparison with the CDM model 
 
Although our model is based on that of CDM, there are four significant 
differences. First, we incorporate innovation height, or novelty, into the model. As 
argued in Section I, such an inclusion is important because new-to-market product 
innovation is likely to affect firm performance, leading to technological spillover. 
Second, we consider both legal and non-legal means of protecting innovation 
benefits. Earlier work, while recognizing that patents do not represent a sufficient 
means of protecting knowledge (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 1987), has 
not systematically examined non-legal means. Third, we separately consider firm 
sales of new and existing products as measures of firm performance. While CDM 
consider in their second stage the share of a firm’s sales that is innovation-related 
(equivalent to the sum of the firms’ sales of new and existing products), such an 
15CDM include physical capital and the portion of employees who are engineers or administrators. 
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approach may not be adequate to capture cannibalization. Fourth, we consider both 
the inflow and outflow of technology by using information on the firm’s 
acquisitions and provisions of technology. Most studies, including CDM, do not 
include outflow in their analytical framework. 
 
2. Estimating equations 
 
Based on the theoretical framework detailed above, we estimate a set of 
equations for firm i. Equation (1) corresponds to the first part of the model, 
determining firm’s R&D expenditures. Because there are many firms with zero 
R&D expenditures, we choose to use a Tobit model:  R&Di* = x1,iβ1 + u1,I, (1)    R&Di =   R&Di*  if  R&Di* > 0,                                  0    otherwise, 
 
where R&Di represents the firm’s R&D expenditures and x1,i includes the dummy 
variables that capture, respectively, the factors of industry, market expansion, 
technology acquisition, information sourcing, firm size, product differentiation, and 
public financial support, along with the number of competitors in the domestic 
market. 
Equations (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the second part of the model. Since the 
dependent variables are all binary, we choose the following probit models: 
 Noveltyi = α2R&Di + x2,iβ2 + u2,i, (2)         where u2,i～ N(0,1)  and  Noveltyi =  1  if  Noveltyi* > 0,                                     0  otherwise.  Legali = γ3Noveltyi + x2,iβ3 + u3,i, (3)  where u3,i～ N(0,1)  and  Legali =  1  if  Legali * > 0,                                      0  otherwise.  Non-legali = γ4Noveltyi + x2,iβ4 + u4,i, (4)   where u4,i～ N(0,1)  and  Non-legali =  1  if  Non-legali * > 0,                                     0  otherwise. 
 
in which Noveltyi is equal to one if the product innovation is new to market (and 
zero otherwise), legali is the legal protection dummy, Non-legali is the non-legal 
protection dummy, and x2,i is similar to x1,i except that it does not include the 
number of domestic market competitors.16 
Equations (5) to (7) correspond to the third part of the analytical framework. For 
the technology provision equation, we estimate the following probit models: 
  
16We omit the firm’s R&D expenditures from Equations (3) and (4) to avoid problems of numerical 
convergence. 
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(5)      log(Newsalesi) = α5R&Di + [Noveltyi, Legali, Non-legali]η5 + x5,iβ5 + u5,i,                     (6)    log(Existingsalesi) = [Noveltyi, Newsalesi, Noveltyi*Newsalesi]ρ6 + x6,iβ5 + u6,i,      (7)         Provisioni* = α7R&Di + [Noveltyi, Legali, Non-legali]η7 + x5,iβ7 + u7,i,              where u7,i～ N(0,1)  and  Provisioni =  1  if  Provisioni* > 0,                                  0  otherwise, 
 
Here, the variable Newsalesi and Existingsalesi represent the sales of a new product 
and of existing products, respectively; Provisioni is a dummy capturing technology 
provision through open sourcing or consortia participation; x5,i includes x2,I plus 
purchased tangible fixed assets and the number of workers in R&D; and x6,i 
includes the logarithm of the firm’s total sales and the firm size and industry 
dummies. 
 
3. Methodology and summary statistics 
 
We estimate the parameters of this system of equations via maximum likelihood 
estimation. Estimation samples are restricted to firms that conduct innovation 
activities and achieve product innovation, which reflects our interest in innovation 
output, including the height (i.e., novelty) of product innovation. This restriction 
causes few problems as long as we focus on the economic impact of product 
innovation conditional on a firm conducting innovation activities and achieving 
product innovation. Note that CDM also examine only firms achieving innovation. 
We omit observations with missing values for any of the models’ variables; the 
characteristics of the omitted firms are similar to those without missing values.17 
The resulting sample size is 539.18 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 
models’ variables. 
 
TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS  
      Mean   Std. Dev. 
Novelty  47.40% 50.00% Sales of a new product (million JPY) 5148.1 53945.3 
Sales of existing products (million JPY) 42354.8  188152.8  
R&D expenditure (million JPY) 4508  41395.2 
Firm size    
 Mid-sized 24.90% 43.30% 
 Large 62.80% 48.40% Number of competitors  10.2 7.64 Product differentiation  61.97% 48.57% Acquisition of tangible fixed assets (million JPY) 7179.3  47235.0  
No. of workers in R&D  202.2  1374.6  (Continued)  
17There is little difference in the average size, age, and industry of the sampled firms. However, our obtained 
t-test results do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is a difference in average sales and firm age 
between the two subsamples. We also cannot reject the hypothesis of a correlation between the existence of 
missing values and the firm’s industry classification, based on Pearson chi-squared test. 
18The original sample size was 1,224 before we omitted these observations. 
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS (Continued)  
      Mean   Std. Dev. 
Information    
 Enterprise group, etc. 77.50% 41.80% 
 Suppliers 57.90% 49.40% 
 Customers or clients 68.50% 46.50% 
 Competitors 36.40% 48.20% 
 Private research institutes, etc. 24.20% 42.90% 
 Universities, etc. 34.20% 47.50% 
 Public research institutes 28.60% 45.20% 
 Academic conference, etc. 36.40% 48.20% 
 Professional publications, etc. 43.20% 49.60% 
 Exhibitions, etc. 53.70% 49.90% 
 Patent information 37.50% 48.50% Technology acquisition    
 Buyout 9.70% 29.60% 
 R&D outsourcing 37.00% 48.30% 
 Purchase of equipment, etc. 51.30% 50.00% 
 Company split-up 5.30% 22.40% 
 Licensing contract 20.50% 40.40% 
 Open sourcing 13.40% 34.10% 
 Consortium 11.70% 32.20% 
 Alliance 16.30% 37.00% 
 Accepting researchers, etc. 16.30% 37.00% Technology provision    
 Open sourcing or consortia 11.70% 32.20% Public financial support  26.20% 44.00% Protection    
 Legal means 53.80% 49.90% 
  Non-legal means 72.00% 45.00% 
Observations   539 
 
We attempt to correct for possible sampling bias via the following method. First, 
for all firms included in JNIS, we regress a dummy variable indicating whether a 
given firm is included in our estimation sample on a set of control variables, 
including the firm’s total sales, sales cost, total wages, and firm-size and industry 
dummies. Then, we calculate the residual for each firm and include these values in 
Equations (1) to (7) as an additional explanatory variable. The estimation results 
differ little from the results as reported in the next section. 
 
B. Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating Equation (1). Specification (1-a) includes 
all the explanatory variables discussed in Section IV.A. Considering the demand side, 
market expansion is estimated to be statistically significant, whereas the estimated 
coefficients on the dummy variables for technology-push factors are mostly 
insignificant. Two exceptions are technology acquisition through corporate 
reorganization (e.g., a buyout or split) and open sourcing, both of which positively 
affect a firm’s R&D investment. Schumpeterian factors are estimated to have little 
effect on a firm’s R&D investment, implying that they do not directly determine a 
firm’s innovation activities once both demand-pull and technology-push factors are 
controlled for. The coefficient on public financial support is significant and positive. 
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TABLE 2—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (1) 
    Tobit model 
  Dependent variable: R&D expenditures (million JPY) 
    (1-a) (1-b) (1-c) 
Market expansion  8275.22** 8124.01** 8135.44** 
 (s.e.) (4020.59)  (4012.51)  (3965.68)  Technology 
acquisition Buyout 15914.05** 16204.31** 19139.71*** 
 (s.e.) (7053.88)  (6984.60)  (6625.08)  
 R&D outsourcing -2149.15  -2395.67   
 (s.e.) (4546.19)  (4529.89)   
 Purchase of equipment, etc. -2119.86  -1931.71   
 (s.e.) (4211.06)  (4182.13)   
 Company split-up 39097.56*** 39021.40*** 40387.06*** 
 (s.e.) (9164.63)  (9152.60)  (8811.41)  
 Licensing contract 828.84 848.65   
 (s.e.) (5234.19)  (5219.32)   
 Open sourcing 13447.71** 13000.43** 14746.31*** 
 (s.e.) (5648.86)  (5619.70)  (5167.44)  
 Consortium 5190.82  5197.15   
 (s.e.) (6238.81)  (6204.72)   
 Alliance 7539.55  7107.43   
 (s.e.) (5582.68)  (5529.69)   
 Accepting researchers, etc. 2857.23  2606.04   
 (s.e.) (5195.53)  (5184.03)   Information Enterprise group, etc. -185.12  -609.43   
 (s.e.) (4735.60)  (4720.39)   
 Suppliers -2704.37  -3352.89   
 (s.e.) (4016.86)  (3949.60)   
 Consumers or clients 2703.18  3474.55   
 (s.e.) (4467.36)  (4417.88)   
 Competitors 1218.17  1059.49   
 (s.e.) (4205.58)  (4188.76)   
 Private research institutes, etc. 1655.63  1186.53   
 (s.e.) (4536.11)  (4480.14)   
 Universities, etc. 1234.78  1885.10   
 (s.e.) (5068.91)  (5022.86)   
 Public research institutes 3732.63  3876.83   
 (s.e.) (5142.44)  (5120.27)   
 Academic conference, etc. -5991.11  -5729.08   
 (s.e.) (5087.50)  (5045.53)   
 Professional publications, etc. 2075.06  1701.04   
 (s.e.) (4976.04)  (4932.46)   
 Exhibitions, etc. -5902.77  -5369.79   
 (s.e.) (4606.41)  (4568.37)   
 Patent information 5822.03  6718.57   
 (s.e.) (4691.64)  (4613.64)   Firm size Mid-sized 5153.42  6686.65  5862.78  
 (s.e.) (7529.56)  (7370.43)  (7303.05)  
 Large 9945.24  11271.57* 12464.83* 
 (s.e.) (6957.73)  (6783.30)  (6600.65)  Number of 
competitors  179.30  123.38  116.50  
 (s.e.) (248.80)  (243.08)  (241.18)  Product 
differentiation  -1118.27  -1771.30  -2960.48  
 (s.e.) (4078.83)  (4049.63)  (3957.21)  Public financial 
support  7638.40* 7543.09* 9736.94** 
  (s.e.) (4554.47) (4488.56)  
Industry dummies Yes No No 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
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Specifications (1-b) and (1-c) omit the industry dummies and technological factors 
with insignificant estimated coefficients in specification (1-a). These results are 
similar to those of (1-a) except that the coefficient on the large-firm dummy is 
estimated to be significantly positive. Our results are consistent with the findings of 
Cohen and Klepper (1996) and Klepper (1996) who argue that firm size has positive 
impacts on innovation activities. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (2). Specification (2-a) includes 
all explanatory variables discussed in Section IV.A. Interestingly, R&D expenditures 
show no significant impact on the success of new-to-market product innovation, in 
contrast to the result of Duguet (2006) that there is a positive impact of a firm’s 
formal R&D activities on the degree of innovation novelty. One reason for the 
difference in results is that Duguet (2006) does not fully control for the effect of 
demand and technological opportunity, whereas we attempt to do so in the present 
analysis. While we find no positive impact of market expansion on innovation 
novelty, some of the coefficients on the technology acquisition and information 
source indicators are significant. In particular, the indicator for acquiring technology 
by accepting new researchers and that for doing so via sourcing information from 
universities both have positive effects on innovation novelty; the latter effect is 
consistent with Hypothesis 6. Similar to the results of previous studies, universities 
appear to be influential sources of information for new-to-market innovations.  
 
TABLE 3—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (2)  
    Probit model 
  Dependent variable: Innovation novelty 
    (2-a) (2-b) (2-c) 
R&D expenditures  05.04E-060 05.46E-060 08.07E-060 
 (s.e.) (5.24E-06) (5.19E-06) (4.97E-06) Market expansion  00.01  0-0.02  00.03  
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  Technology 
acquisition Buyout 00.390  00.37   
 (s.e.) (0.24)  (0.24)   
 R&D outsourcing 00.13  00.12   
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.14)   
 
Purchase of 
equipment, etc. -0.05  -0.07   
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.13)   
 Company split-up -0.46  -0.49   
 (s.e.) (0.34)  (0.34)   
 Licensing contract 00.19  00.17   
 (s.e.) (0.17)  (0.16)   
 Open sourcing 00.06  00.07   
 (s.e.) (0.19)  (0.19)   
 Consortium 00.28  00.25   
 (s.e.) (0.20)  (0.20)   
 Alliance 00.18  00.14   
 (s.e.) (0.18)  (0.18)   
 
Accepting 
researchers, etc. 00.29* 00.28* 00.33** 
 (s.e.) (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (Continued) 
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TABLE 3—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (2) (Continued) 
    Probit model 
  Dependent variable: Innovation novelty 
    (2-a) (2-b) (2-c) 
Information Enterprise group, etc. 00.240  00.210  
 (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.15)   
 Suppliers -0.110  -0.070   
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.12)   
 Consumers or clients 00.120  00.090   
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.14)   
 Competitors -0.160  -0.170   
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.13)   
 
Private research 
institutes, etc. -0.090  -0.150   
 (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.14)   
 Universities, etc. 00.39** 00.34** 00.32** 
 (s.e.) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  
 
Public research 
institutes -0.40** -0.34** -0.33** 
 (s.e.) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  
 
Academic 
conference, etc. -0.150  -0.110   
 (s.e.) (0.16)  (0.16)   
 
Professional 
publications, etc. -0.250  -0.26* -0.26* 
 (s.e.) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.14)  
 Exhibitions, etc. 00.020  00.020   
 (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.14)   
 Patent information 00.28* 00.30** 00.29** 
 (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  Firm size Mid-sized -0.080  -0.020  -0.020  
 (s.e.) (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.22)  
 Large -0.350  -0.250  -0.190  
 (s.e.) (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.20)  Product 
differentiation  00.18  00.140  00.130  
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  Public financial 
support  -0.110  -0.020  0.000  
  (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Industry dummies          Yes       No No 
Exogeneity test (Wald) 00.010    00.0200  00.290  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
 
Lastly, public financial support has no significant impact on new-to-market 
innovators, leading us to reject Hypothesis 8. This finding might arise partly because 
nonfinancial factors, including the utilization of information from universities, are 
essential for fostering new-to-market innovation, as noted in Section III.C.3. 
Specifications (2-b) and (2-c) omit the industry dummies and technological factors 
with insignificant coefficients in (2-a); the results are essentially the same for (2-a). 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for Equations (3) and (4). 19 
Specifications (3-a) and (4-a) include all of the explanatory variables discussed in 
19Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the instruments is rejected for specifications (3-a), (3-b), and (4-b), an issue 
we leave for future research. 
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Section IV.A except for the firm’s R&D expenditures and industry dummies 20 
whereas specifications (3-b) and (4-b) also omit the technological factors with 
insignificant estimated coefficients. The results indicate that innovation novelty has a 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of seeking each type of protection (legal 
and non-legal). The estimated coefficients, however, do suggest that firms with new-
to-market product innovation are no more likely than other firms to use legal 
protection as opposed to non-legal means. Hence, we cannot reject Hypothesis 7.  
 
TABLE 4—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATIONS (3) AND (4) 
  Probit model 
 Dependent variable: Legal protection Non-legal protection 
  (3-a) (3-b) (4-a) (4-b) 
Innovation novelty  02.10*** 002.07*** 002.11*** 002.09*** 
 (s.e.) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) Market expansion  0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
 (s.e.) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) Technology 
acquisition Buyout -0.290  -0.30* -0.200 
 (s.e.) (0.17)  (0.18) (0.20) 
 R&D outsourcing -0.090  -0.090  
 (s.e.) (0.11)  (0.11)  
 
Purchase of 
equipment, etc. 0.05  0.08  
 (s.e.) (0.10)  (0.11)  
 Company split-up 0.28  0.34  
 (s.e.) (0.23)  (0.24)  
 Licensing contract -0.110  -0.110  
 (s.e.) (0.13)  (0.15)  
 Open sourcing -0.100  -0.080  
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.14)  
 Consortium -0.180  -0.210  
 (s.e.) (0.15)  (0.16)  
 Alliance -0.090  -0.070  
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.20)  
 
Accepting 
researchers, etc. -0.180  -0.22* -0.200 
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.13) (0.14) Information Enterprise group, etc. -0.170  -0.130  
 (s.e.) (0.12)  (0.14)  
 Suppliers 0.05  0.04  
 (s.e.) (0.10)  (0.10)  
 Consumers or clients -0.050  -0.040  
 (s.e.) (0.11)  (0.14)  
 Competitors 0.11  0.09  
 (s.e.) (0.10)  (0.13)  
 
Private research 
institutes, etc. 0.09  0.10  
 (s.e.) (0.11)  (0.12)  
 Universities, etc. -0.200  -0.240  
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.15)  
 
Public research 
institutes 00.26** 0.17 00.31* 00.29* 
 (s.e.) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (Continued) 
 
 
20We omit these variables in order to avoid a numerical convergence problem. 
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TABLE 4—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATIONS (3) AND (4) (Continued) 
  Probit model 
 Dependent variable: Legal protection Non-legal protection 
  (3-a) (3-b) (4-a) (4-b) 
Information Academic conference, etc. 0.12   0.10  
 (s.e.) (0.12)  (0.12)  
 
Professional 
publications, etc. 00.22* 0.15 0.22* 0.18 
 (s.e.) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) 
 Exhibitions, etc. 0.01  0.01  
 (s.e.) (0.11)  (0.11)  
 Patent information -0.160  -0.220  
 (s.e.) (0.14)  (0.13)  Firm size Mid-sized 0.10 0.16 0.01 -0.030 
 (s.e.) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
 Large 0.30 00.33* 0.19 0.13 
 (s.e.) (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17) Product 
differentiation  -0.110 -0.110 -0.100 -0.040 
 (s.e.) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) Public financial 
support  0.01 -0.030 0.01 -0.030 
 (s.e.) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) Industry dummies  No No No No Exogeneity test (Wald) 00008.54*** 00031.34*** 000000 1.58 000009.17*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equation (5). We omit the technological 
variables from these specifications because otherwise all estimated coefficients 
become insignificant.21 Specifications (5-a) and (5-b) include the logarithms of the 
value of tangible fixed assets acquired and of the number of workers in R&D with 
and without industry dummies, respectively, whereas specifications (5-c) and (5-d) 
do not. 
The results of estimating specification (5-a) indicate that new-to-market product 
innovation has a significant positive effect on new product sales, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. This implies that new-to-market product innovation could help 
firms stave off severe competition. In contrast, the coefficient on legal protection is 
estimated to be negative: legal means of protecting the benefits of innovation are not 
shown to affect firm performance in terms of innovation-related sales in this case. 
The other estimates show that firms with many employees, larger numbers of R&D 
workers, and higher values of tangible fixed assets tend to have greater sales from 
product innovation for those innovations that meet or surpass the median sales 
distribution. 
The results for specification (5-b) are similar to those of (5-a) except that the 
coefficient on public financial support is estimated to be significantly negative. 
However, it is likely that this is capturing the difference in the market environment, 
as specification (5-b) omits the industry dummies. 
21Hence, Hypothesis 5 would not be supported here, in that we find little evidence that technology acquired 
through consortia directly affects the sales of a new product. 
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TABLE 5—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (5) 
    Linear model 
  Dependent variable: Sales of a new product (logarithm) 
    (5-a)  (5-b) (5-c) (5-d) 
Innovation novelty   1.26* 1.26 0.95 0.94 
 (s.e.) (0.73) (0.78) (0.72) (0.77) Legal protection  00-2.13*** 00-2.19*** -0.280 -0.280 
 (s.e.) (0.82) (0.83) (0.74) (0.73) Non-legal protection  1.10 1.47 1.49 01.78* 
 (s.e.) (0.95) (1.01) (0.92) (0.98) Market expansion  0.21  0.210 00000.53*** 000 0.54*** 
 (s.e.) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) Firm size Mid-sized   01.20*** 0001.13*** 00001.73*** 00001.71*** 
 (s.e.) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) 
 Large 0  2.04*** 0002.00*** 00003.47*** 0003.45*** 
 (s.e.) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) Product differentiation  0.04 0.06 -0.080 -0.090 
 (s.e.) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) Public financial 
support  -0.220 -0.34* -0.33*  -0.44** 
 (s.e.) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) Acquisition of tangible 
fixed assets 
[logarithm] 0000.28*** 0000.31***   (s.e.) (0.06) (0.06)   
    001.07E-05*** 1.09E-05*** 
 (s.e.)   (2.78E-06) (2.83E-06) No. of workers in R&D [logarithm] 00000.58*** 0000.55***   
 (s.e.) (0.09) (0.09)   
    001.14E-04*0 1.12E-04 
  (s.e.)   (6.75E-05) (6.95E-05) Industry dummies   Yes No Yes No 
Exogeneity test (Sargan) 26.04 24.32 35.80** 32.16** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating Equation (6). Specifications (6-a) and (6-b) 
adopt the specification described in Section IV.A.2 with and without industry 
dummies, respectively, while specifications (6-c) and (6-d) include the logarithm of 
the sales of a new product. 
The results of specification (6-a) indicate that new product sales have a 
significant negative effect on those of existing products. This is consistent with the 
view that a new product cannibalizes a part of the sales of a firm’s existing 
products, consistent with Hypothesis 2. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
interaction term for innovation novelty and new product sales is significant and 
positive, nearly cancelling out the cannibalization term. Hence, we can interpret 
this finding as indicating that the cannibalization effect is attenuated by innovation 
novelty, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
The results of specification (6-b) are similar to those of (6-a). In specifications 
(6-c) and (6-d), the coefficients on new product sales and the interaction term are 
estimated as insignificant, although their signs are the same as in (6-a). 
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TABLE 6—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (6) 
    Linear model 
  Dependent variable: Sales of existing products (logarithm) 
    (6-a) (6-b) (6-c) (6-d) 
Innovation novelty  -0.03  -0.05 0 -0.09  -0.11  
 (s.e.) (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.35)  (0.36)  Sales of a new 
product  00-1.12E-05** 00-1.21E-05**   
 (s.e.) (5.55E-06) (5.72E-06)   
 [logarithm]   -0.07  -0.08  
 (s.e.)   (0.05)  (0.05)  Innovation novelty * sales of a new 
product 0001.14E-05** 001.23E-05**   
 (s.e.) (5.74E-06) (5.94E-06)   
 [logarithm]   0.02  00.02  
 (s.e.)   (0.06)  (0.06)  Total sales [logarithm] 00000.99*** 00001.00*** 00001.02*** 00001.03*** 
 (s.e.) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  Firm size Mid-sized 0.04  0.03  0.07 00.07  
 (s.e.) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
 Large 0.03  0.02  0.10  00.090  
  (s.e.) (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07)  
Industry dummies   Yes No Yes No 
Exogeneity test (Sargan) 00000024.38  22.170 29.51 27.09 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
 
TABLE 7—ESTIMATION RESULTS, EQUATION (7) 
    Linear model 
  
Dependent variable: Technology provision 
through open sourcing or consortia 
    (7-a) (7-b) (7-c) (7-d) 
Innovation novelty  0002.29** 0002.09** 0002.52** 000002.25** 
 (s.e.) (0.93) (0.82) (1.23) (1.04) Legal protection  -1.110 -1.010 -1.170 -1.050 
 (s.e.) (1.06) (0.97) (1.12) (1.00) Non-legal protection  00.280 00.580 00.280 00.630 
 (s.e.) (0.98) (0.98) (1.07) (1.08) Market expansion  -0.040 -0.030 -0.030 -0.020 
 (s.e.) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) Firm size Mid-sized 00.190 00.130 00.200 00.160 
 (s.e.) (0.30) (0.27) (0.35) (0.33) 
 Large 00.530 00.410 00.600 00.480 
 (s.e.) (0.38) (0.31) (0.50) (0.43) Product differentiation  -0.100 -0.090 -0.120 -0.100 
 (s.e.) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) Public financial support  00.170 00.080 00.190 00.090 
 (s.e.) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14) Acquisition of tangible 
fixed assets 
[logarithm] -0.020 00.000   (s.e.) (0.04) (0.04)   
    -8.14E-070 -2.77E-070 
 (s.e.)   (2.16E-06) (1.91E-06) No. of workers in R&D [logarithm] 00.050 00.020   
 (s.e.) (0.08) (0.08)   
    06.20E-060 2.59E-0700 
  (s.e.)   
 
 
(4.74E-05) 
 
(4.40E-05) 
 
Industry dummies   Yes No Yes No 
Exogeneity test (Sargan) 7.65 9.20 6.30 8.06 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. “s.e.” 
refers to the standard error. 
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Finally, Table 7 includes the estimates for Equation (7). We omit the 
technological variables from these specifications because they are all estimated to 
be insignificant. Specifications (7-a) and (7-b) include the logarithms of the value 
of tangible fixed assets acquired and of the number of workers in R&D with and 
without industry dummies, respectively, while specifications (7-c) and (7-d) do not 
include these variables. For all specifications, the coefficient on innovation novelty 
is estimated as significant and positive. This implies that a firm with new-to-market 
product innovations are more likely to provide their technology through open 
sourcing and/or consortia, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Hence, the 
technological spillover arising from novel product innovation are more likely to 
occur through channels that seldom entail monetary compensation. 
  
V. Conclusion 
  
This study has focused on the degree to which new-to-market product innovation 
influences firm performance (i.e., sales of new and existing products), 
technological spillover, and other related characteristics. We proposed eight 
hypotheses and tested them through empirical analysis of JNIS data from April 
2006 to March 2009. Our results are generally consistent with the hypotheses. We 
found that innovators tend to achieve higher sales from new-to-market product 
innovations and are less likely to suffer from cannibalization of existing sales. 
Moreover, new-to-market product innovation tends to result in knowledge spillover 
to other firms through channels that do not normally assume monetary 
compensation—i.e., consortia and open sourcing. As is always the case with any 
empirical research, these empirical results of the paper should be taken cautiously; 
in particular, because the paper’s estimates could be subject to weak instruments. 
Further studies on this line warrants fruitful research. 
Considering the policy implications of our findings, the result that new-to-
market product innovation significantly improves firm performance and is 
associated with technological spillover suggests that policy interventions 
promoting such innovation may be beneficial to society. Our empirical results show 
that firms with new-to-market product innovation are more likely to use 
information from universities, and less likely to rely on legal protection. However, 
we also note that public financial support may not always stimulate new-to-market 
product innovation, especially for small-sized firms. How to better support small-
sized firms to work with universities may be an important policy challenge, which, 
if solved, would encourage more widespread innovation. 
This paper has focused on the Japanese experience owing to information 
availability. While our findings are generally comparable to the French experience, 
as analyzed in Duguet (2010), it would be interesting to compare these results to 
the South Korean experience, where product innovation is much more active than 
in either Japan or France, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Collaboration between 
Korean and Japanese researchers to match the Korean National Innovation Survey 
with the JNIS might yield research and policy insights useful to not only these two 
countries but also other Asian economies. 
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